

Remuneration report 2024

① This chapter includes disclosures related to ESRS 2 and GOV3.

Remuneration for the Board of Management

Remuneration Policy and its implementation in 2024

The current Remuneration Policy was updated and approved by the annual General Meeting of Shareholders in 2024. The full Remuneration Policy is available on [Corbion's website](#). This section describes how the Remuneration Policy has been implemented in 2024.

The Remuneration Policy has the ambition to align with and support the business and sustainability strategy of Corbion, creating sustainable long-term stakeholder value whilst providing the Board of Management with an internationally competitive and balanced remuneration package compared to companies with a similar size and international scope.


The implementation of the Remuneration Policy contributes to long-term value creation as follows. As a guiding principle, the Remuneration Policy emphasizes accountability and pay-for-performance. It is designed with the majority of the remuneration at-risk through short and long-term incentives and is weighted towards the long term. This variable compensation is a mix of financial and non-financial metrics, reflecting Corbion's balanced focus on creating sustainable long-term value creation while delivering on its short-term objectives. The short-term performance metrics are designed to drive achievement of operational targets that are required for the successful execution of the strategy. The long-term performance metrics are aimed at the delivery of strategic targets and sustainable long-term goals.

Remuneration reference levels


The total remuneration level consists of base salary, benefits allowance, short-term incentive and long-term incentive. The levels of these elements are based on a reference group of 18 companies and take into account the international guidelines as set by leading shareholder advisors. Included are nine European companies that are active in the same or comparable industries as Corbion. In addition, nine Dutch general industry companies are included that operate within the same governance system and societal context. Every two years, a reference check is performed to independently benchmark the total compensation levels against the reference group.

The base salary compared to the at-target percentages of the short-term and long-term incentives for the CEO and CFO yield the following overviews:

CEO



CFO



Base salary

Members of the Board of Management receive a base salary. In accordance with the Remuneration Policy, periodic reviews are conducted to assess whether an adjustment to the base salary is warranted, based on the median total direct compensation of the designated reference group.

The actual base salary of the Board of Management members is determined by the Supervisory Board taking into account the median of the total direct compensation of the reference group and is based on personal performance delivery. There are no automatic increases in the actual base salary levels. As per 1 April 2024, the annual base salary for Olivier Rigaud (CEO) amounted to € 725,000. Peter Kazius became CFO per 15 May 2024. His annual base salary per that date amounted to € 425,000.

Benefits allowance

Corbion does not provide (social) benefits such as a company car, individual retirement, medical or life insurance to members of the Board of Management. Therefore, and in accordance with the management services agreements, each member of the Board of Management is provided with a benefits allowance. This is a fixed annual amount of € 200,000 for the CEO and € 150,000 for the CFO to cover the cost of these types of expenses.

Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP)

Entitlements and performance measures

Members of the Board of Management are eligible for a short-term incentive. The STIP rewards operational performance delivery on an annual basis and is aimed at profitably growing Corbion's business in line with the strategy. The STIP pay-out at-target level is set at 60% of base salary for the CEO and 50% for the CFO.

The STIP performance measures are organic net sales growth, adjusted EBITDA, Free Cash Flow, and operational Sustainability metrics.

Measure	Weighting
Adjusted EBITDA	27.5%
Organic Net Sales Growth	27.5%
Free cash flow	25%
Sustainability-Social	10%
Sustainability-Environment	10%

For 2024, the Social Sustainability measure focused on safety and more specifically, the Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR), and the focus for the Environmental Sustainability measure was the energy per ton of product.

Performance targets and pay-out levels

At the beginning of each year, the Supervisory Board establishes target levels for each performance measure based on previous year's performance, the annual budget, and the longer-term strategic plan. A threshold performance level is determined, below which no payout is granted, and a maximum performance level is established for full pay. Achievements up to the maximum performance level are rewarded in cash. For performance exceeding the maximum level, payouts are made in shares, which are subject to a three-year lock-up period.

The following table presents the performance levels and performance bandwidths.

Performance measure	Performance level	Performance bandwidth*	Performance payout (weighted)
Adjusted EBITDA 27.5%	Below threshold	Below 90% of at-target performance	0%
	Threshold – maximum	Linear between 90% - 110% of at-target performance	50% – 150% at-target level
	Overperformance	Linear between 110% - 120% of at-target performance	150% – 200% at-target level
Organic net sales growth 27.5%	Below threshold	Below 300 bps below of at-target performance	0%
	Threshold – maximum	Linear with a range of 600 bps around at-target performance (equally divided below and above at-target)	50% – 150% at-target level
	Overperformance	Linear up to 300 bps above maximum performance level	150% – 200% at-target level
Free cash flow 25%	Below threshold	Below the higher of (i) minus 20 million euro and (ii) minus 20% of at-target performance	0%
	Threshold – maximum	Linear between threshold target and overachievement target	50% – 150% at-target level
	Overperformance	Above the higher of (i) plus 20 million euro and (ii) plus 20% of at-target performance	150% – 200% at-target level
For each of the two operational ESG performance measures 10%	Below threshold	Annually at the beginning of the year, the Supervisory Board will determine the performance brackets for the applicable operational ESG performance measures.	0%
	Threshold – at-target		50% at-target level
	At-target – maximum		100% at-target level
	Maximum – overperformance		150% at-target level
20% in total	Above overperformance		200% at-target level
		A financial underpin applies	

Pay-out for STIP 2024

For 2024, the Supervisory Board applied the performance bandwidth as stated above.

The payout for the Board of Management members regarding the various measures lead to an overall payment of 143.3% for STIP 2024 based on achievements as mentioned in the following table.

Measure	Weight	Payout in cash	Payout in Shares
Adjusted EBITDA	27.5%	136.6%	
Organic net sales growth	27.5%	130%	
Free cash flow	25%	150%	50%
TRIR	10%	0%	0%
Energy	10%	150%	50%
Total weight	100%		
Total payment		125.8%	17.5%

For Sustainability, the targets and achievements were as follows. For safety/TRIR, the target was 0.60, which was not achieved (the 0.60 is based on our internal definition of total recordable injuries per 200,000 hours, translating into a target of 3.00 based on the CSRD definition of the TRIR (per mln hours), which is the definition used in the [Sustainability statements](#) from this year onwards). For energy, the target was the number of Corbion sites (target was three sites) that achieved specific energy targets related to the energy per ton of product. This target was overachieved as six sites achieved the specific energy targets.

This resulted in (i) a payment in cash of € 547,230 for Olivier Rigaud and of € 267,325 for Peter Kazius, and (ii) a payment in shares of 3,284 shares for Olivier Rigaud (representing a value of € 76,125 at the time of vesting based on a vesting price of € 23.18) and 1,604 shares for Peter Kazius (representing a value of € 37,188 at the time of vesting based on a vesting price of € 23.18).

Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)

Entitlements and performance measures

Members of the Board of Management are eligible for a long-term incentive aimed at fostering value creation in alignment with the interests of all stakeholders of Corbion. This incentive is assessed over a performance period of three calendar years and is paid out in shares, which are subject to a shareholding requirement. Each year, members of the Board of Management are entitled to a conditional grant of shares under this LTIP arrangement, with the value of the grant set at 120% of base salary for the CEO and at 100% for the CFO.

The following table presents the LTIP performance measures with their weights.

Measure	Weighting
Relative TSR	35%
Adjusted EBITDA	20%
ROCE	20%
Sustainability-Strategic 1	12.5%
Sustainability-Strategic 2	12.5%

Performance targets and pay-out levels

Prior to each conditional grant the Supervisory Board sets target levels for the LTIP performance measures.

For the 2024-2026 series, relative TSR performance, threshold pay-out is set at meeting the eighth position in the peer group. Target pay-out is achieved at the fourth and fifth position in the peer group and maximum pay-out is achieved at reaching the first and second position in the peer group.

The following table illustrates the ranking and corresponding vesting percentage.

Ranking	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9-16
Percentage of TSR-metric-linked performance shares vesting	150%	150%	125%	100%	100%	75%	50%	50%	0%

At the end of the three-year performance period, relative TSR performance of the company versus the TSR peer group will be independently assessed by a leading bank in the Netherlands.

For the 2024–2026 series, the sustainability performance measures are set for reduction of scope 1 and 2 emissions and SDG contribution.

The following table presents the performance levels and performance bandwidths.

Performance measure	Performance level	Performance bandwidth*	Performance payout (weighted)
Relative TSR 35%	Threshold – maximum	See above	See above in paragraph 9 of this remuneration policy
Adjusted EBITDA 20%	Below Threshold	Below 75% of at-target performance	0%
	Threshold – maximum	Linear between 75% - 125% of at-target performance	50% – 150% at-target level
ROCE** 20%	Below threshold	Below 75% of at-target performance, whereby the threshold level will be set at the weighted average of the pre-tax WACC(s)**** as reported in the annual report***	0%
	Threshold – maximum	Linear between 75% - 125% of at-target performance	50% – 150% at-target level
For each of the two strategic ESG performance measures 12.5%	Below threshold	Annually at the beginning of the year, the Supervisory Board will determine the performance brackets for the applicable strategic ESG performance measures.	0%
	Threshold – at-target		50% at-target level
	At-target – maximum		100% at-target level
25% in total	Above maximum		150% at-target level

* The Supervisory Board may determine narrower percentage ranges.

** The performance over a three-year period will be calculated as the average of the three annual ROCE results as reported in the three respective annual reports in such period.

*** If the threshold level (the weighted average of the pre-tax WACC(s) as reported in the annual report) is higher than 75% of the at-target amount, this higher amount will be applied. If the threshold level (the weighted average of the pre-tax WACC(s) as reported in the annual report) is lower than 75% of the at-target amount, this 75% amount will be applied.

**** The pre-tax WACC(s) of the business segments per end of the year as disclosed in Corbion's annual report weighting based on the adjusted Operating Result of the respective business units as disclosed in Corbion's annual report the average for the year being the average of the end of the year and the end of prior year weighted pre-tax WACCs.

Pay-out for the LTIP 2021–2023 series and granted shares for the LTIP 2024–2026 series

The following table presents the number of conditionally granted, but not yet vested shares, as per 1 January 2024 for each of the members of the Board of Management.

Name, position	Specification of the plan	Shares awarded, not vested per 1 January 2024
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2021-2023	14,722
P. Kazius, CFO*		1,232
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2022-2024	23,323
P. Kazius, CFO*		2,063
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2023-2025	26,300
P. Kazius, CFO*		2,628
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2024-2026	49,714
P. Kazius, CFO		19,456

* Shares awarded to P. Kazius based on Sr. Management scheme (applicable before CFO start of 15 May 2024)

The LTIP 2021–2023 series has led to a total payout of 76.2% of the at-target LTIP for Olivier Rigaud, as shown in the following table. Olivier Rigaud used the option of selling shares to finance the income tax due on the vested shares.

For TSR, an actual pay-out level of 0% was achieved as Corbion ranked 13th in the peer group.

Performance Measure	Weight	Payout
EBITDA	20%	63%
Organic sales growth	25%	150%
ROCE	12.5%	59%
Sustainability	12.5%	150%
TSR	30%	0%
Total	100%	76.2%

The following table represents the number of vested shares and their value for the members of the Board of Management. In addition, the conditionally granted shares are mentioned with their value on grant date. For the series LTIP 2024-2026 the grant date has changed to 1 January, in order to change the vesting period of three years to the beginning of the year (first time 2027).

Board of Management member	Number of vested shares LTIP 2021-2023	Value (vesting price € 21.76)	Number of grant LTIP 2024-2026	Value (grant price € 17.50)
O. Rigaud, CEO	11,218	€ 244 104	49,714	€ 869 995
P. Kazius, CFO	1,018**	€ 22 151	19,456*	€ 282 112

* P. Kazius, CFO as of 15 May 2024

** Shares awarded for P. Kazius based on Sr. Management scheme (applicable before CFO start of 15 May 2024)

The overview below shows the number of conditionally granted but not yet vested shares as per 31 December 2024 for each of the members of the Board of Management, the grant price of the granted shares, and the remaining vesting period.

Name, position	Specification of the plan	Grant price	Shares awarded, not vested per 31 December 2024	Vesting date
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2022-2024	€ 34,73	23,323	May 2025
P. Kazius, CFO*			2,063	
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2023-2025	€ 33,08	26,300	May 2026
P. Kazius, CFO*			2,628	
O. Rigaud, CEO	LTIP 2024-2026	€ 17,50	49,714	February 2027
P. Kazius, CFO			19,456	

* Shares awarded for P. Kazius based on Sr. Management scheme (applicable before CFO start of 15 May 2024)

Overview remuneration

The total annual remuneration for the current Board of Management in 2024 amounted to € 2.7 million (on an annualized basis) including STIP over 2024 (2023: € 1.6 million for current Board of Management members). The table below shows the amounts the respective member of the Board of Management received/was entitled to in 2024 in terms of base salary, STIP, benefits allowance and received/was entitled to in 2024 by way of vesting (LTIP).

Thousands of euros	Year	Base salary	STIP	LTIP	Benefits allowance	Other compensation	Relocation	Total
O. Rigaud, CEO	2024	725	623	244	200			1,792
	2023	713	0	666	200			1,579
P. Kazius*, CFO	2024	425	305	22**	150			902
	2023							
Total	2024	1,150	928	266	350	0	0	2,694
Total	2023	713	0	666	200	0	0	1,579

* P. Kazius, CFO as of 15 May 2024, amounts annualized

** Shares awarded for P. Kazius based on Sr. Management scheme (applicable before CFO start of 15 May 2024)

As no payment for STIP 2023 was made and the STIP 2024 resulted in pay-out, the ratio of fixed versus variable remuneration changed in 2024 compared to 2023. The ratio of the fixed remuneration (base salary and benefits allowance) versus the variable remuneration (STIP, LTIP, and other compensation) is 52% for Olivier Rigaud versus 48% (was 58%/42%), and 64% versus 36% for Peter Kazius (on an annualized basis).

The following table shows the remuneration costs based on the applicable IFRS standard and does not necessarily reflect the actual amounts paid.

	IAS 24.17 category	Short- term employee benefits	Share- based payments	Post- employment benefits	Other long- term benefits	Termination benefits	Total
Thousands of euros	2024	Base salary*	STIP	LTIP	Pension benefits	Other benefits	Termination benefits
O. Rigaud		937	623	870			2,430
P. Kazius (in his position as CFO as from May 2024)		367	305	235			907
Total Board of Management (current members)		1,304	928	1,105		0	3,337

Thousands of euros	2023	Base salary*	STIP	LTIP	Pension benefits	Other benefits	Termination benefits
O. Rigaud		924	-	810			1,734
Total Board of Management (current member)		924	-	810			1,734

* Base salary also includes social security contributions and compensation, mainly allowances for expenses.

Internal pay ratios and five-year performance overview

In line with good corporate governance practices regarding remuneration policies, Corbion measures the internal pay ratios within the company on a yearly basis. More specifically, Corbion has calculated the pay ratio of the Board of Management relative to the average company employee. For the Board of Management, the total remuneration cost (based on IFRS) is used. The average remuneration of all Corbion employees is calculated as the total remuneration of all Corbion employees on an IFRS basis (see Note 6 to the Consolidated Financial Statements) divided by the average number of Corbion employees on an FTE basis. The average number of FTEs is calculated on a monthly basis. The average remuneration of all Corbion employees in 2024 amounted to € 95,683 (2023: € 85,314).

For the CEO, the pay ratio to the average employee is 25.3 (2023: 20.3) and for the CFO it is 9.5. The overview below shows, for the last five financial years, the total remuneration (based on IFRS) of the CEO, the current and former CFO (as the current CFO started in May 2024), th average remuneration of all Corbion employees, the internal pay ratios, and the adjusted EBITDA and earnings per share (EPS) of Corbion.

Name, position	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
O. Rigaud, CEO (A)	1,629 (20%***)	1,817 (12%)	2,208 (22%)	1,734 (-21%)	2,430 (40%)
E. van Rhede van der Kloot, CFO (B)*	1,226 (7%)	1,262 (3%)	1,341 (6%)	1,058 (-21%)	1,962 (85%)
P. Kazius CFO (C)**					907
Average salary employees (D)	87 (7%)	86 (-1%)	92.5 (8%)	85.3 (-8%)	95.7 (12%)
Internal pay ratio (A/D)	18.6	21.1	0.0	20.3	25.3
Internal pay ratio (B/D)	14	14.7	0.0	12.4	
Internal pay ratio (C/D)					9.5
Adjusted EBITDA	158.8 (9%)	135.8 (-14%)	184.4 (36%)	191.8 (4%)	175 (-9%)
EPS	1.24 (182%)	1.33 (7%)	1.53 (15%)	1.23 (-20%)	0.79 (-35%)

* E. van Rhede van der Kloot, CFO up to 15 May 2024

** P. Kazius, CFO as of 15 May 2024

*** Based on continuing operations

Shares in the capital of the company

As at 31 December 2024, Corbion had a capital interest of 0.2%, amounting to 117,217 shares. In 2024, Corbion neither issued new shares nor repurchased shares for the LTIP programs for the Board of Management or (senior) management.

Remuneration former member of the Board of Management

Mr. Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot stepped down as CFO and member of the Board of Management after the annual General Meeting of Shareholders on 15 May 2024. The contract of assignment with Mr. Van Rhede van der Kloot expired on 1 December 2024.

As per 1 April 2024, the annual base salary for Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot amounted to € 450,000.

For the STIP 2024, the payout regarding the various measures lead to an overall payment of 143.3% based on achievements as mentioned in the table below:

Measure	Weight	Payout in cash	Payout in Shares
Adjusted EBITDA	27.5%	136.6%	
Organic net sales growth	27.5%	130%	
Free Cash Flow	25%	150%	50%
TRIR	10%	0%	0%
Energy	10%	150%	50%
Total weight	100%		
Total payment		125.8%	17.5%

Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot was pro-rata entitled to the STIP 2024. This resulted in (i) a payment in cash of € 259,463 and a payment in shares of 1,557 shares (representing a value of € 36,094 at the time of vesting (based on a vesting price of € 23.18).

Pay-out for the LTIP 2021–2023 series

The LTIP 2021–2023 series has led to a total payout of 76.2% of the at-target LTIP for Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot, as shown in the table below:

Performance Measure	Weight	Payout
EBITDA	20%	63%
Organic sales growth	25%	150%
ROCE	12.5%	59%
Sustainability	12.5%	150%
TSR	30%	0%
Total	100%	76.20%

Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot used the option of selling shares to finance the income tax due on the vested shares.

The table below shows the amounts which Eddy van Rhede van der Kloot (i) received/was entitled to in 2024 (base salary, STIP, benefits allowance, termination payment) and (ii) received/was entitled to in 2024 by way of vesting (LTIP):

Thousands of euros	Year	Base salary	STIP	LTIP	Benefits allowance	Other compensation**	Relocation	Total
E. van Rhede van der Kloot*, CFO	2024	413	296	147	138	600		1,594
	2023	444	0	404	150			998
Total	2024	413	296	147	138	600		1,594
Total	2023	444	0	404	150	0		998

* E. van Rhede van der Kloot, CFO up to 15 May 2024. His contract of assignment ended 1 December 2024.

** Termination payment E. van Rhede van der Kloot

The table below shows the remuneration costs based on the applicable IFRS standard and does not necessarily reflect the actual amounts paid:

	IAS 24.17 category	Short-term employee benefits	Share-based payments	Post-employment benefits	Other long-term benefits	Termination benefits	Total	
Thousands of euros	2024	Base salary	STIP	LTIP	Pension benefits	Other benefits	Termination benefits	
E. van Rhede van der Kloot		561	296	505			600	1,962
Total		561	296	505			600	1,962

Thousands of euros	2023	Base salary	STIP	LTIP	Pension benefits	Other benefits	Termination benefits	
E. van Rhede van der Kloot		605	-	453				1,058
Total		605	-	453				1,058

Share plans for employees

Corbion has a LTIP program for (senior) management and a LTIP program for the Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management). The long-term incentive covers a performance period of three calendar years. The LTIP 2024-2026 series performance measures are the same as for the Board of Management: TSR (35%), adjusted EBITDA (20%), sustainability (25%), and ROCE (20%). For certain categories of (senior) management, part of the LTIP is not performance related and is only restricted to continued employment for three years.

Measure	Weighting ExCo	Weighting group (A)	Weighting group (B)	Weighting group (C)
Relative TSR	35%	35%	24.5%	10.5%
Adjusted EBITDA	20%	20%	14%	6%
ROCE	20%	20%	14%	6%
Sustainability-Strategic 1	12.5%	12.5%	8.75%	3.75%
Sustainability-Strategic 2	12.5%	12.5%	8.75%	3.75%
Retention			30%	70%

The total number of conditionally granted but not yet vested shares as per 1 January 2024 for (senior) management and Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management) is as follows:

Specification of the plan	Shares awarded, not vested per 1 January 2024
LTIP 2021-2023	58,091
LTIP 2022-2024	98,046
LTIP 2023-2025	121,936
LTIP 2024-2026	215,690

The LTIP 2021-2023 series led to a payout to the Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management) of 76.2%. For (senior) management, three groups are defined having a LTIP which have weights and payouts as mentioned in the underneath table.

Performance Measure	Weight ExCo	Payout ExCo	Weight Group (A)	Payout group (A)	Weight group (B)	Payout group B	Weight group (C)	Payout group C
EBITDA	20%	63%	20%	95%	14%	95%	6%	95%
Organic sales growth	25%	150%	25%	150%	17.5%	150%	7.5%	150%
ROCE	12.5%	59%	12.5%	59%	8.75%	59%	3.75%	59%
Sustainability	12.5%	150%	12.5%	150%	8.75%	150%	3.75%	150%
TSR	30%	0%	30%	0%	21%	0%	9%	0%
Non Performance Related					30%	30%	70%	70%
Total	100%	76.2%	100%	82.6%	100%	87.8%	100%	94.8%

The total number of vested shares received by (senior) management and Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management) under the LTIP 2021-2023 series is 40,943 representing a value of € 890,920 at the time of vesting (based on a vesting price of € 21.76).

The total number of performance shares conditionally granted to (senior) management and Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management) for the LTIP 2024-2026 series (possible vesting in 2027) is 216,932 representing a value of € 3,796,310 at the time of the grant (based on a grant price of € 17.50).

The table below shows the number of conditionally granted but not yet vested shares as at 31 December 2024 for (senior) management and Executive Committee members (not being members of the Board of Management) jointly, the grant price of the granted shares, and the remaining vesting period.

Specification of the plan	Grant price	Shares awarded, not vested per 31 December 2024	Vesting date
LTIP 2022-2024	€ 34,73	72,432	May 2025
LTIP 2023-2025	€ 33,08	87,409	May 2026
LTIP 2023-2025	€ 17,50	274,731	February 2027

Remuneration for the Supervisory Board

Total remuneration for the members of the Supervisory Board in 2024 amounted to € 0.6 million (2023: € 0.5 million). In accordance with the approved Remuneration Policy for Supervisory Board each member of the Supervisory Board receives an annual base fee of € 60,000; the Vice-Chair receives € 70,000, and the Chair receives € 85,000.

For membership of the Audit Committee, an additional fee of € 15,000 applies and for the Chair € 20,000. Members of the Appointment and Governance Committee, Remuneration Committee, Science & Technology Committee, and Sustainability & Safety Committee receive an additional fee of € 10,000; the fee for the Chair of these committees amounts to € 15,000. In 2024, an ad hoc committee (Corporate Development Committee) was in place and the members received € 10,000 and the Chair € 15,000. In addition, members receive reimbursement of expenses and a travel allowance for international travel.

Members of the Supervisory Board are entitled to neither variable remuneration nor shares in the company or any option rights relating thereto. The total remuneration for each (former) member of the Supervisory Board complies with the Remuneration Policy for the Supervisory Board, as it stays within the boundaries of this policy, and no deviations from this policy have been applied. Members of the Supervisory Board are paid by Corbion nv. They did not receive remuneration from a subsidiary or another company whose financials are consolidated by Corbion nv. Corbion does not grant loans, advances, or guarantees to members of the Supervisory Board.

Breakdown remuneration Supervisory Board	IAS 24.17 category	Short-term employee benefits ¹	Total	
	Year	Base fee	Committee fee	
<i>Thousands of euros</i>				
Mathieu Vrijzen, Chair (Chair Appointment & Governance Committee / Chair temporary Corporate Development Committee / member Remuneration Committee / member Science and Technology Committee)	2024	85	50	135
	2023	70	23	93
Ilona Haaijer, Vice-Chair (Chair Remuneration Committee / member temporary Corporate Development Committee / member Appointment and Governance Committee / member Science and Technology Committee)	2024	70	45	115
	2023	60	23	83
Liz Doherty (Chair Audit Committee / member temporary Corporate Development Committee / member Sustainability and Safety Committee)	2024	60	40	100
	2023	50	22	72
William Lin (Chair Sustainability and Safety Committee / member Audit Committee)	2024	60	30	90
	2023	50	19	69
Dessi Temperley (member Audit Committee / member Sustainability and Safety Committee until 10 August 2023 / member Remuneration Committee and member Appointment and Governance Committee from 10 August 2023)	2024	60	35	95
	2023	50	20	70
Steen Riisgaard (Chair Science and Technology Committee / member Remuneration Committee and member Appointment and Governance Committee until 10 August 2023 / member Sustainability and Safety Committee since 10 August 2023)	2024	60	25	85
	2023	50	21	71
	Total 2024	395	225	620
	Total 2023	330	128	458

¹ Excluding expenses